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Abstract
People are victims of consumer fraud and scams on a daily basis. However, in most cases, the victims 
could have detected the fraud if only they had checked for inconsistencies in the scammer’s message. 
What makes some people detect and avoid a scam while others fall prey to it? This article investigates, 
in two experiments, the eff ects of ego depletion, issue involvement, need for cognition, and strength 
and valence of arguments on attitudes and attitude change. Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that, 
in the case of high ego depletion, the participants’ attitudes would be similar in both strong and weak 
argument conditions, whereas in the case of low ego depletion, their attitudes would be signifi cantly 
more favorable in strong argument conditions. In Experiment 2, we hypothesized that participants’ 
attitudes would follow the direction of the valence of the persuasive message presented to them. The 
results corroborated the hypothesis of Experiment 2 alone. Overall, the results indicate a low tendency 
for the participants to agree with the persuasive messages. Future studies could benefi t from using 
diff erent manipulations of the elaboration likelihood and from testing the persuasiveness of fraudulent 
messages.
Keywords: Persuasion, consumer behavior, elaboration likelihood model, ego depletion.
Persuasão e Níveis de Elaboração: Efeitos Experimentais 
da Qualidade, Valência e Esgotamento do Ego
Resumo
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Pessoas são vítimas de golpes e fraudes contra o consumidor diariamente. No entanto, na maioria dos casos, 
a vítima poderia ter detectado a fraude se tivesse dado atenção para as inconsistências na mensagem do 
estelionatário. Por que algumas pessoas são capazes de detectar e evitar um golpe enquanto outras não? 
Este artigo investiga em dois experimentos, os efeitos do esgotamento do ego, do envolvimento com a 
questão, da necessidade de cognição, assim como a força e valência de argumentos sobre as atitudes e a 
mudança de atitude. O Experimento 1 testou a hipótese de que, sob um alto esgotamento do ego, atitudes 
seriam semelhantes em ambas as condições de argumentos fortes e fracos, enquanto sob um baixo 
esgotamento do ego, atitudes seriam signifi cativamente mais favoráveis na condição de argumentos 
fortes. No Experimento 2, esperava-se que as atitudes dos participantes iriam seguir a direção da valência 
da mensagem persuasiva apresentada. Os resultados apenas corroboraram a hipótese do Experimento 2. 
Em geral, os resultados indicam uma pequena tendência dos participantes a concordar com as mensagens 
persuasivas. Pesquisas futuras poderão se benefi ciar do uso de diferentes manipulações da probabilidade 
de elaboração e de testar o poder de persuasão de mensagens fraudulentas.
Palavras-chave: Persuasão, comportamento do consumidor, modelo de probabilidade de elaboração, 
esgotamento do ego. 
Persuasión en Diferentes Niveles de Elaboración: Efectos 
Experimentales de Fuerza, Valencia y Agotamiento del Ego
Resumen
Las personas son víctimas de fraudes y estafas de consumidores a todos los dias. Sin embargo, en la 
mayoría de los casos, la víctima podría haber detectado el fraude si solo se verifi caran las inconsistencias 
en el mensaje del estafador. Este artículo investiga en 2 experimentos los efectos del agotamiento del 
ego, de la participación del problema, de la necesidad de cognición, de la fuerza y valencia de los 
argumentos sobre la actitud y el cambio de actitud. El experimento 1 probó la hipótesis de que bajo 
un alto agotamiento del ego, las actitudes serían similares tanto en las condiciones de argumentos 
fuertes como débiles, mientras que bajo un empobrecimiento bajo del ego, las actitudes serían más 
favorables en la condición de argumento fuerte. En el Experimento 2 se esperaba que las actitudes de 
los participantes siguieran la dirección de la valencia del mensaje persuasivo. Los resultados respaldaron 
las hipótesis solo del Experimento 2. En general, los resultados indican una pequeña tendencia de los 
participantes a aceptar los mensajes persuasivos. La investigación futura puede benefi ciarse del uso de 
diferentes manipulaciones de la probabilidad de elaboración y de probar la capacidad de persuasión de 
los mensajes fraudulentos.
Palabras clave: Persuasión, comportamiento del consumidor, modelo de elaboración de probabilidad, 
agotamiento del ego. 
While trying to sell a product, salespeople 
may use a wide array of tactics to better persuade 
consumers. Often, consumers later on regret 
their purchase, feel deceived and ask themselves 
why they bought it in the fi rst place – and in 
many cases, that was precisely the salesperson’s 
intention. This phenomenon, deceptive persua-
sion, occurs when a persuasion agent fools his/
her target by fabricating, manipulating or hiding 
information about a product or service, merely to 
better convince the target to purchase it (Boush, 
Friestad, & Wright, 2015). One type of deceptive 
persuasion is consumer fraud. In this case, the 
product may not exist, and the objective is not 
selling, but rather appropriating the target’s 
money or personal information (Parodi, 2008). 
In most cases of consumer fraud, the information 
provided by a scammer, someone who is 
attempting to defraud others, contains a series 
of inconsistencies (e.g., inexistent companies, 
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prizes that are too good to be true, and false 
policies or laws) that could have been easily 
noticed by the victims had they scrutinized and 
fact-checked the message’s content. However, 
many consumers fail to notice these scam cues 
and fall victim to scammers. What causes people 
to evaluate a persuasive message in diff erent 
ways?
Many recent models in social psychology 
work with the idea that there are two types of 
thinking: one that is quick and more unconscious, 
and one that is slow and more deliberate (Evans 
& Stanovich, 2013). In a general sense, these 
so-called dual-process models explain that 
part of cognitive processing occurs outside of 
one’s awareness, by dividing human cognitive 
processing into two sets of systems, usually 
named Type 1 and Type 2 (Fiske & Taylor, 
2013). Psychologists use these models to 
understand how and why people overestimate 
the level of control over their own thoughts 
and behaviors. Type 1 processes work quickly 
and automatically, with little or no eff ort on 
the part of the individual. Such processes are 
more longstanding in human evolutionary 
history and are associated with tasks such as 
pattern recognition, emotion elicitation and 
other automatic processes (Stanovich, 2009). 
In contrast, Type 2 processes are slow and 
deliberate, demanding greater cognitive eff ort 
by the individual, and are considered to have 
emerged more recently in human evolution. Such 
processes are associated with the establishment 
of long-term goals, analytic processing, and the 
suppression of Type 1 processes.
Diff erent cognitive costs are associated 
with each type of processing. Conscious control 
demands much more eff ort from the individual, 
especially when Type 2 processing must over-
ride a Type 1 process (Evans & Stanovich, 
2013). Evidence also suggests that cognitive 
resources for conscious processing are limited, 
and when drained, an individual experiences 
greater diffi  culty using Type 2 processing and 
relies more on automatic processing (Hagger, 
Wood, Stiff , & Chatzisarantis, 2010). This 
may lead to a higher frequency of errors and 
irrational decisions because, more often than 
not, beliefs, attitudes and decisions are actually 
processed automatically and only later processed 
consciously, creating an illusion of control 
(Stanovich, 2013). However, Type 1 processes 
also lead to faster, better decision making in 
many situations, in the form of heuristics (Raab 
& Gigerenzer, 2015)
Heuristics can be defi ned as shortcuts used 
to simplify and facilitate judgment in situations 
involving little time for decision making (Fiske 
& Taylor, 2013; Gilovich, Griffi  n, & Kahneman, 
2002). Such strategies rely on ignoring a piece of 
information in order to make decisions that are 
faster, more economical and more accurate, as 
compared to decision-making processes that are 
more complex (Gigerenzer & Gaissmaier, 2011). 
However, in many cases, these eff ort-saving 
strategies can result in less decision-making 
accuracy (Stanovich, 2012). For example, an 
ill-intentioned individual, armed with only a 
layman’s knowledge of these characteristics 
of human thinking, can exploit Type 1 and 2 
processing vulnerabilities in order to persuade 
and deceive a victim (Boush et al., 2015; 
Pratkanis & Farquhar, 1992). In fact, literature 
reviews (Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 
2014; Pratkanis & Shadel, 2005) of the tactics 
used by scammers indicate that they frequently 
try to take advantage of people’s quick decision 
making and lack of self-control (Langenderfer & 
Shimp, 2001).
Persuasion can be defi ned as a deliberate 
attempt to change the attitudes of another person 
(Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). The elaboration 
likelihood model (ELM) describes persuasion as 
an interaction between the agent and the target of 
persuasion, in which diff erent individuals enjoy 
diff erent levels of elaboration of the message 
that is presented, and can be persuaded via one 
of two routes (Petty & Briñol, 2014). When the 
target thoroughly analyzes, with great eff ort 
and elaboration, each argument presented in the 
persuasion message, it is said that he or she used 
the central route. On the other hand, when the 
target undergoes a change of attitude without 
analyzing each argument presented, with little 
eff ort and elaboration, he or she is considered 
to have taken the peripheral route. Because of 
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these two diff erent forms of elaboration, the 
strength of a persuasive message’s arguments 
can have less infl uence on one’s attitudes if 
one is processing through a peripheral route 
(Teeny, Briñol, & Petty, 2017). Accordingly, 
if one’s elaboration level is high (central route 
to persuasion), the strength of the arguments 
will be evaluated more thoroughly. The 
ELM is clearly a dual-process model created 
specifi cally to understand persuasion processes. 
While the central route may be considered 
Type 2 processing, the peripheral route can be 
considered Type 1 processing. The route used 
is determined by many factors, which include 
one’s motivation to elaborate the message and 
one’s ability to evaluate the arguments presented 
(Petty & Briñol, 2014).
Factors Infl uencing Elaboration              
Likelihood
Various factors are determinants of an 
individual’s motivation and ability to process 
a persuasive message (Petty & Briñol, 2014). 
Among the factors that aff ect one’s motivation is 
the issue involvement of the message’s subject 
and one’s need for cognition. When exposed 
to a message of great personal relevance, 
people tend to be more involved and thus more 
motivated to elaborate it. Petty and Briñol 
(2014) also demonstrated that the factors that 
infl uence one’s ability to elaborate a message 
include the following: the presence of distracting 
variables, cognitive resources, and knowledge 
about the subject. In the presence of distracting 
elements during a persuasion attempt, a person 
may fi nd it harder to elaborate the message and 
there will be a greater likelihood of using a 
heuristic to evaluate it (Teeny et al., 2017). An 
individual may lack cognitive resources because 
of limitations in his/her working memory span 
(Schmeichel & Hofmann, 2012). Such a lack of 
cognitive resources could hamper one’s ability 
to think about the message, thus increasing one’s 
likelihood of being infl uenced by peripheral cues 
of the message (Burkley, 2008; Wheeler, Briñol, 
& Hermann, 2007)particularly under eff ortful 
resistance (i.e., strong arguments. An ego 
depletion procedure can be used to infl uence the 
participants’ use of cognitive resources. Finally, 
a person who has knowledge about the subject 
matter of the persuasion attempt may be more 
motivated to elaborate it and can perform such 
elaboration with greater ease (Petty & Briñol, 
2014). 
Issue Involvement and Temporal          
Proximity
Issue involvement can be manipulated by 
changing the temporal proximity of the con-
sequences of the message. Temporal proximity 
refers to how far in the future a persuasive 
message’s consequences are, and it may 
infl uence the likelihood that an individual will 
elaborate the message in an eff ortful manner 
(Teeny et al., 2017). Furthermore, construal 
level theory (CLT) describes the relationship 
between diff erent levels of construal and diff erent 
psychological distances (Trope & Liberman, 
2012). Thus, when contemplating an event that 
is distant in the future, a person will have a more 
abstract level of thinking and be less motivated 
to elaborate it. In contrast, an event that is bound 
to happen soon generates a more concrete level 
of construal and greater motivation to process 
a related persuasive message. It is reasonable 
to expect that, when presenting a non-trivial 
issue, manipulating the temporal proximity 
(close - distant) will aff ect levels of construal 
and the extent to which someone will think 
about the message presented. When faced with 
consequences that are far in the future, the 
strength of the arguments will have less eff ect 
on the participants (Petty & Cacioppo, 1984). 
As a side note, it is possible that individuals 
with a future temporal orientation may be less 
sensitive to this variable (Pimenta & Iglesias, 
2014); however, studying the moderating role of 
temporal orientation goes beyond the scope of 
this paper.
Ego Depletion
According to the strength model of self-
control (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & 
Tice, 1998), conscious and deliberative processes 
rely on a limited resource (as Type 2 processes) 
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that, when exhausted, has a negative impact 
on one’s executive function. This condition of 
diminished strength to exert self-control is called 
ego depletion (Hagger et al., 2010). Therefore, 
an individual with less self-control will have 
a harder time, for example, resisting acting 
on an emotion. Evidence suggests that self-
control plays an important role in resistance to 
persuasion (Burkley, 2008) and that resistance 
to persuasion requires a capacity for self-control 
and self-regulation (Sripada, Kessler, & Jonides, 
2014). Particularly important is the fi nding that 
impairment of self-control weakens one’s ability 
to produce counterarguments, for it leads to 
less resistance to persuasion (Burkley, 2008; 
Wheeler et al., 2007)particularly under eff ortful 
resistance (i.e., strong arguments. It follows that 
a person experiencing ego depletion is less likely 
to properly elaborate a persuasive message. Such 
an individual will rely more on peripheral cues 
to evaluate the message and can thus be more 
easily persuaded by the presentation of weak 
arguments.
Need for Cognition
Need for cognition (NFC) is a cognitive 
style associated with enjoying and engaging in 
eff ortful thinking more frequently (Cacioppo, 
Petty, Kao, & Rodriguez, 1986). It is a relatively 
stable individual-diff erence variable that exhibits 
negative correlations with external locus of 
control and neuroticism and positive correlations 
with problem solving and objectivism 
(Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996). 
Scoring higher on the Need for Cognition Scale 
is associated with engaging more frequently in 
deep thought, as well as enjoying reasoning and 
problem solving. Other studies also indicate that 
this cognitive style predicts analytical reasoning 
tendencies (Kokis, Macpherson, Toplak, West, 
& Stanovich, 2002) and critical thinking skills 
(West, Toplak, & Stanovich, 2008), even after 
controlling for general intelligence. In persuasion 
processes, need for cognition plays a moderating 
role, aff ecting an individual’s motivation to 
elaborate the message presented (Haugtvedt & 
Petty, 1992). Hence, those who score higher on 
the Need for Cognition Scale are expected to 
be more motivated to think about a persuasive 
message and evaluate its consistency, and thus 
more sensitive to the strength of the arguments 
presented.
Objective
We conducted two experiments aimed at 
investigating, in a Brazilian sample, the eff ects 
of ego depletion, temporal proximity, need 
for cognition, and strength (Experiment 1 and 
2) and valence (Experiment 2) of arguments 
on a persuasion attempt, using the ELM as an 
explanatory model for attitudes and attitude 
change. 
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 sought both to test participants’ 
ability to resist persuasion when experiencing 
ego depletion and to ascertain the main eff ects 
and interactions between three independent 
variables, temporal proximity and message 
strength. It was expected that participants 
experiencing high ego depletion would be less 
likely to elaborate a persuasive proposal and 
would thus be more easily persuaded by weak 
arguments. These relationships are expressed in 
four hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1 – A strong argument condition 
produces attitudes that are more positive towards 
a proposal than those produced by a weak 
argument condition.
Hypothesis 2 – There is an interaction 
eff ect between temporal proximity and argu-
ment strength. Participants presented with a 
consequence far in the future tend to be less 
motivated to elaborate the arguments presented 
in a proposal and thus tend to have attitudes that 
are more positive towards the proposal. This 
eff ect should be stronger among participants in 
the weak argument condition (i.e., ‘argument 
quality vs. temporal proximity’ interaction).
Hypothesis 3 – There is an interaction eff ect 
between ego depletion and argument strength. 
Participants experiencing high ego depletion tend 
to be less motivated to elaborate the arguments 
presented in a proposal and thus tend to have 
attitudes that are more positive towards the 
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proposal. This eff ect should be stronger among 
participants in the weak argument condition (i.e., 
‘argument quality vs. ego depletion’ interaction).
Hypothesis 4 – There is a three-way inter-
action eff ect between ego depletion, temporal 
proximity and argument strength. Participants 
presented with a consequence far in the future 
tend to be less motivated to elaborate the argu-
ments presented in a proposal and thus tend to 
have attitudes that are more positive towards the 
proposal. This eff ect should be strongest among 
participants in situations involving both a weak 
argument and high ego depletion.
The Need for Cognition Scale was also 
employed, in order to control interindividual 
diff erences in tendency to engage in deep 
thought.
Method / Experiment 1
Participants
The present experiment enjoyed the 
participation of 128 volunteers (59.1% 
women) recruited on the campus of a major 
public university, with a mean age of 20.1 
years (SD = 2.2). The sample was comprised 
of university students (90.6%) in 35 diff erent 
majors. Sample size was determined based on 
the ability to detect an eff ect size of medium 
magnitude with a statistical power of .80 using 
G*Power 3 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 
2007). The experiment employed a 2 x 2 x 2 
independent factorial design. The variables were 
manipulated between subjects, and participants 
were randomly assigned to each of the three 
independent variables: strength of the arguments 
presented (strong vs. weak), ego depletion (high 
vs. low condition) and temporal proximity (close 
in time vs. distant).
Instruments
Independent Variables. 
Argument Strength Manipulation. Two 
small texts advocating the establishment of a 
mandatory test at the end of all undergraduate 
courses were created by the research team. 
Participants were told that the text they would 
read was a summary written by an unidentifi ed 
professor of the university. Each text version 
presented four diff erent arguments in favor of 
the proposal; the writing of these arguments 
was based on previous research (Petty, Harkins, 
& Williams, 1980). The weak-argument 
text contained poor arguments based on per-
sonal opinion (e.g., “I believe that students 
coming from universities that have this type 
of evaluation will fi nd it easier to get a job”). 
The strong-argument text contained better-
constructed arguments based on data (e.g., 
“Previous research indicates that the income of 
students coming from these universities is, on 
average, 30% higher. This diff erence remains 
even if other factors are considered, such as the 
reputation of the university...”). A pilot study 
with 43 participants was conducted to test this 
manipulation. The participants were randomly 
selected to read one of the two texts, answering 
questions about its diffi  culty, complexity and 
persuasiveness. The tests indicated that there 
were no statistically signifi cant diff erences 
between the texts in terms of diffi  culty [F(1, 41) 
= 2.36, p = .13, η2 = .05] or complexity [F(1, 41) 
= .082, p = .78, η2 = .002] and that the strong-
argument text was considered more convincing, 
F(1, 41) = 3.95, p = .05, η2 = .084. 
Temporal Proximity Manipulation. Tem-
poral proximity (close in time vs. distant) was 
manipulated by informing the participants as to 
the period the test would be implemented. In the 
close condition, participants were informed that 
the test would begin to be mandatory as of the 
next year. Since all of the participants would 
graduate after the next year, they would thus be 
aff ected by this change. In the distant condition, 
participants were informed that the test would 
be mandatory in six years. All the participants 
were taking undergraduate courses that last 5 
years or less.
Ego Depletion Task. The ego depletion 
task was inspired by the task employed by 
Wheeler et al. (2007)generation and application 
of contradictory information. In the fi rst part, 
participants received a page with randomly 
generated letters and numbers, and were ins-
tructed to search for and cross out all the e’s that 
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they could fi nd on the page in less than 5 minutes. 
The second part included the manipulation of 
ego depletion (high vs. low). In the low ego-
depletion condition, participants were simply 
instructed to repeat the fi rst part of the task. In 
the high ego-depletion condition, participants 
received another copy of the same page and 
were instructed to repeat the task, yet with 
two new rules: First, they should not cross out 
e’s appearing after a vowel; and, second, they 
should not cross out e’s separated from another 
vowel by a consonant. 
Covariate Variable: Need for Cognition. 
The Need for Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty 
& Kao, 1984) is comprised of 18 items that 
describe preferences related to the tendency to 
engage in deep thought (e.g., “I prefer complex 
problems to simple problems”). Participants 
rate each item according to a fi ve-point scale 
ranging from 1 (Not characteristic at all) to 5 
(Extremely characteristic). In the present study, 
we employed a Brazilian version of the Need for 
Cognition Scale (Caldas et al., 2019). We then 
performed principal-axis factor analysis of the 
18 items of the Need for Cognition Scale (KMO 
= .76). One factor had an eigenvalue above 
Kaiser’s criterion of 1 and explained 19.13% of 
the variance. Again, a unidimensional solution 
was employed, but six items were excluded 
because they had factor loadings below .3 (α = 
.80).
Dependent Variables. Attitudes towards the 
proposal were measured in two ways: a semantic 
diff erential scale and two questions measuring 
attitude change.
Semantic Diff erential Scale. A seven-point 
semantic diff erential scale was created with eight 
pairs of adjectives used to evaluate the proposal 
(harmful/benefi cial, good/bad, positive/negative, 
necessary/unnecessary, terrible/great, useful/
useless, unpleasant/pleasant, and favorable/
unfavorable). Participants responded to each of 
the eight pairs of adjectives by indicating how 
close their attitudes were to one of the extremes 
of the scale. In order to check whether the 
semantic diff erential scale was a reliable measure 
of attitudes, principal-axis factor analysis of the 
8 items was conducted (KMO = .89). Only one 
factor had an eigenvalue above Kaiser’s criterion 
of 1 and explained 54.40% of the variance. A 
unidimensional solution was retained, with no 
items being excluded (α = .90). 
Attitude Change. Two questions were 
used to measure whether there was any attitude 
change on the part of the participants. The fi rst 
question was asked after explaining the proposal 
yet before participants read the persuasive 
text; it stated, “Before reading the text, please 
indicate, on the scale below, your response to 
the following question: What is your attitude 
in relation to the establishment of a mandatory 
test at the end of undergraduate courses?” The 
second question was posed after participants read 
the persuasive text; it stated, “Please indicate, on 
the scale below, your response to the following 
question: What is your attitude in relation to the 
proposal you just read?” Both questions were 
answered on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 
(Totally against) to 5 (Totally in favor).
Procedures
Data Collection Procedures. After 
recruitment, participants were introduced to 
the experiment and randomly allocated to 
one of the two conditions of the ego depletion 
task. The task was presented as a “measure of 
attention.” After completing the ego depletion 
task, participants read a short introductory 
statement affi  rming that a professor was 
proposing to establish a mandatory test at the 
end of undergraduate courses. After reading 
this proposal, yet before reading the persuasive 
text, participants were asked about their initial 
attitudes towards the proposal. The participants 
were then randomly assigned to one of the 
four conditions combining argument quality 
and temporal proximity. Participants in each 
condition received the corresponding version of 
the persuasive text. They were instructed to read 
it. After reading the text, they were asked about 
their attitudes towards the proposal. They were 
then given the semantic diff erential scale and 
the need for cognition scale. Upon completion, 
they were debriefed as to the real purpose of the 
experiment.
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Data Analysis Procedures. The data were 
analyzed by means of descriptive and inferential 
procedures, including mean comparison tests 
by analysis of variance (ANOVA), and factor 
analysis. Initially, preliminary analyses were 
conducted to fi t the assumptions of the statistical 
tests performed. Subsequently, a three-way 
independent ANOVA was carried out to test the 
hypotheses of Experiment 1.
Ethical Procedures. The authors certify 
that all data collection procedures in Experiment 
1 complied with the ethical standards stipulated 
by Brazilian law, in accordance with Brazilian 
National Health Council Resolution No. 196/96. 
The research did not involve any sensitive issues, 
given the nature of the subject and the self-report 
procedures employed.
Results of Experiment 1
In order to measure attitudes towards the 
proposal, the average of the items of the semantic 
diff erential scale was computed (hereafter 
referred to as the “semantic diff erential variable”). 
In this measure, higher values indicate attitudes 
that are more positive. The covariate (need for 
cognition) proved to be signifi cantly correlated 
with the participant’s attitude [F(1, 115) = 5.15, 
p =.025, ηp
 2 = .04]; however, none of the results 
diff ered after controlling for need for cognition. 
Since need for cognition did not alter the results, 
it was not used as a covariate in an ANCOVA 
model.
A three-way independent ANOVA was 
employed to test the eff ect of the three IVs on the 
semantic diff erential variable. A signifi cant main 
eff ect of argument strength on attitudes toward the 
proposal was found [F(1, 116) = 8.54, p = .004, 
ηp
 2 = .07], indicating that the strong argument 
generated attitudes that were more favorable (M 
= .71, SE = .025) than those produced by the 
weak argument (M = .61, SE = .025; 95% CIs 
[.66, .76] and [.56, .66], respectively). Neither 
temporal proximity [F(1, 116) = 1.12, p = .29, ηp
 
2 = .01] nor ego depletion [F(1, 116) = 2.15, p = 
.15, ηp
 2 = .02] had a statistically signifi cant eff ect 
on attitudes towards the proposal. Furthermore, 
there were no signifi cant two-way interactions 
between the independent variables: argument 
strength vs. ego depletion [F(1, 116) = .62, p = 
.43, ηp
 2 = .005]; argument strength vs. temporal 
proximity [F(1, 116) = 1.43, p = .24, ηp
 2 = .012]; 
and temporal proximity vs. ego depletion [F(1, 
116) = .034, p = .85, ηp
 2 < .001]. The three-way 
interaction (argument strength vs. ego depletion 
vs. temporal proximity) proved to be insignifi cant 
[F(1, 116) = 1.87, p = .17, ηp
 2 = .02]. 
The attitude-change measure indicated 
that, overall, participants were more favorable 
towards the proposal after reading the text (M = 
3.71, SE = .097, 95% CI [3.52, 3.90]) than before 
reading it (M = 3.53, SE = .093, 95% CI [3.35, 
3.72]; F(1 ,120) = 5.32, p = .023, ηp
 2 = .042). 
This result is further corroborated by a signifi cant 
two-way interaction between argument strength 
and attitude change [F(1, 120) = 14.62, p < .001, 
ηp
 2 = .11], indicating that the strong argument 
produced greater attitude change than did the 
weak argument. Neither temporal proximity 
[F(1, 120) = 1.71, p = .19, ηp
 2 = .01] nor ego 
depletion [F(1, 120) = .54, p = .47, ηp
 2 = .004] 
exhibited a statistically signifi cant eff ect on 
attitude change. Furthermore, there were no 
signifi cant interactions between the independent 
variables: attitude change vs. argument strength 
vs. ego depletion [F(1, 120) = .082, p = .78, ηp
 
2 = .001]; attitude change vs. argument strength 
vs. temporal proximity [F(1, 120) = .73, p = 
.40, ηp
 2 = .01]; and attitude change vs. temporal 
proximity vs. ego depletion [F(1, 120) = 1.28, p 
= .26, ηp
 2 = .01].
The assumptions for ANOVA were also 
tested, revealing no signifi cant evidence of bias 
in any of the statistical models. Levene’s test 
of homogeneity of variance indicated that the 
variances are roughly equal across the diff erent 
combinations for the factors in the semantic 
diff erential variable [F(7, 116) = 0.52, p = .82]. 
An analysis of the Q-Q Plots indicated that the 
semantic diff erential variable was normally 
distributed across the diff erent combinations.
Discussion of Experiment 1
As expected, argument strength was a 
predictor of attitudes, with strong arguments 
generating attitudes that were more positive 
than those produced by weak arguments. Need 
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for cognition was also found to be a signifi cant 
predictor of attitudes. However, after controlling 
for it, there was no signifi cant change in the model 
used to explain the results. It thus appears that, 
contrary to expectations based on the literature 
(Haugtvedt & Petty, 1992), need for cognition 
did not have a moderating eff ect on persuasion, 
because high-NFC individuals were aff ected in 
the same way that low-NFC individuals were. 
This could be a consequence of the dimensional 
structure of the NFC measure, which is diff erent 
from that of the original study. On the other 
hand, this pattern may also suggest that, despite 
diff erences in need for cognition, the individuals 
were in general not motivated to elaborate the 
proposal presented.
The interaction eff ects described in Hypo-
theses 2 and 3 were also not found to be 
signifi cant, and several possible explanations 
for this will now be examined. First of all, 
Hypothesis 2 describes an interaction eff ect, 
between temporal proximity and argument 
quality, on attitudes towards the proposal. 
The absence of this interaction eff ect indicates 
that, contrary to expectations based on the 
literature (Cacioppo et al., 1986), the temporal 
proximity of the consequences did not aff ect 
the manner in which participants elaborated the 
proposal in a detectable way. It is possible that 
the manipulation did not aff ect the personal 
involvement of participants, which means they 
were less motivated to elaborate the proposal. 
Second, Hypothesis 3 describes an interaction 
eff ect, between ego depletion and argument 
strength, on attitudes towards the proposal. 
The lack of such an interaction eff ect also 
goes against the literature (Burkley, 2008)
particularly under eff ortful resistance (i.e., 
strong arguments, suggesting that the level of 
ego depletion did not aff ect the fi nal generated 
attitude. This can also be explained by a lack of 
motivation to elaborate the proposal on the part 
of the participants, as that would lead to less use 
of conscious processes and make self-control 
resources less important (Teeny et al., 2017). 
Such limitations were not detected in time due 
to the lack of a pretest of the ego depletion and 
temporal proximity variables. Additionally, 
no manipulation check for these variables was 
included in any of the experiments.
Another possible explanation for these 
results is that there could have been limitations 
associated with the ego-depletion task itself, 
although it was adapted directly from the original 
(Baumeister et al., 1998). Though not measured, 
resources for self-control may not have been 
aff ected by the task in a detectable way. 
Accordingly, in future studies, a manipulation 
check should also test this explanation. 
Nonetheless, a recent meta-analysis (Carter & 
McCullough, 2014) suggests that the literature on 
ego-depletion eff ect may suff er from publication 
bias. After correcting for small-study eff ects, 
Carter and McCullough found that the eff ect 
of ego depletion was not statistically diff erent 
from zero. Hence, a better option could be to 
drop the ego depletion task in favor of another 
manipulation that aff ects working memory, such 
as a cognitive load task (Petty & Briñol, 2014; 
Schmeichel & Hofmann, 2012).
One fi nal possible explanation relies on the 
observation that, overall, participants tended to 
have favorable attitudes towards the proposal 
(M = 3.53, SD = 1.06), even before reading the 
persuasive message, with only 21.1% of the 
participants being partially or completely against 
the proposal. It is possible that participants tended 
to simply agree with the proposal presented 
without thinking much about it, because that 
would require the least eff ort. Previous research 
suggests that the direction of an argument aff ects 
persuasion diff erently. When a participant is 
already in favor of a persuasive message, he will 
likely make less eff ort to think about the message 
(Briñol, McCaslin, & Petty, 2012). Experiment 2 
was devised to test this explanation.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 was designed as a follow 
up to Experiment 1, testing for a new eff ect: 
the valence of the proposal (i.e., favorable vs. 
unfavorable). In this experiment, valence refers 
to whether the persuasive text was in favor of 
or against the proposal. The objective was to 
investigate the main and interaction eff ects 
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between two independent variables: strength of 
the arguments and valence of the proposal. It 
was expected that participants’ attitudes would 
tend to follow the direction of the valence of the 
persuasive proposal despite the strength of its 
arguments, as expressed in the two hypotheses 
below:
Hypothesis 1 -– The valence of the proposal 
has a congruency eff ect on attitudes towards the 
proposal, whereby the valence of the attitudes 
follows the direction of the valence of the 
proposal.
Hypothesis 2 – There is an interaction 
eff ect between the valence of the proposal and 
the strength of the arguments. The congruency 
eff ect is greater in the strong argument 
condition, generating stronger positive attitudes 
in the favorable condition and stronger negative 
attitudes in the unfavorable condition. 
Method / Experiment 2
Participants
The present experiment enjoyed the 
participation of 67 volunteers (60.6% women) 
recruited on the campus of a major public 
university, with a mean age of 19.8 years (SD 
= 3.48). The experiment employed a 2 x 2 
independent factorial design. Participants were 
allocated to the two independent variables 
manipulated between subjects: strength of 
the arguments presented (strong vs. weak) 
and valence of the proposal (favorable vs. 
unfavorable). The size of the sample was 
calculated to detect an eff ect size as the main 
eff ect of the strength of the arguments in 
Experiment 1 and with a statistical power of .80 
using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007). 
Instruments
Manipulations of Argument Strength and 
Message Valence. The valence of the proposal 
was manipulated by introducing arguments 
against it. Accordingly, for this manipulation, 
two new short texts were developed, both of 
which employed the same structure of the texts 
used in Experiment 1. However, instead of 
arguing in favor of the proposal, the new texts 
contained four arguments against it. The weak-
condition text contained weak arguments, while 
the strong-condition text contained stronger 
arguments. Both of the pro-proposal texts (weak 
and strong) used in Experiment 1 were also used 
in Experiment 2, for the favorable condition. 
As in Experiment 1, participants were told that 
the text they were about to read was a summary 
written by an unidentifi ed professor of the 
university. 
Covariate Variable: Need for Cognition. 
The Brazilian version of the 18-item Need for 
Cognition Scale (Caldas et al., 2019) was also 
used in Experiment 2. Principal-axis factor 
analysis of the Need for Cognition Scale’s 18 
items was also conducted (KMO = .70). Again, 
a unidimensional solution was employed, yet 
three items were excluded because they had 
factor loadings less than .3 (α = .82).
Dependent Variable. Attitudes toward the 
proposal were assessed using both a semantic 
diff erential scale and two questions measuring 
attitude change.
Semantic Diff erential Scale. The same 
eight-item semantic diff erential scale used in 
Experiment 1 was administered to participants 
in Experiment 2.
Attitude Change. Attitude change was 
measured by way of the same two questions 
used in Experiment 1, and principal-axis factor 
analysis of the Diff erential Semantic Scale’s 
8 items was conducted (KMO = .899) A 
unidimensional solution was retained, and no 
items were excluded (α = .92). 
Procedures 
Data Collection Procedures. Participants 
were recruited in the classroom, and the 
experiment was performed collectively. 
Participants were informed that they would 
read and evaluate a short text. They then each 
received one of the four diff erent versions of the 
instrument, randomly allocated between the two 
independent variables: argument strength and 
proposal valence. They were instructed to read 
the proposal and answer the entire instrument. 
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Lastly, a debriefi ng was conducted upon com-
pletion of the experiment.
Data Analysis Procedures. Data were 
analyzed by means of descriptive and inferential 
procedures, including means comparison tests 
by analysis of variance (ANOVA), and factor 
analysis. A two-way independent ANOVA was 
performed to test the hypotheses.
Ethical Procedures. As in Experiment 1, 
all data collection procedures in Experiment 2 
complied with the ethical standards stipulated by 
Brazilian National Health Council Resolution 
No. 196/96.
Results of Experiment 2
A three-way independent ANOVA between 
attitude change, argument strength and proposal 
valence indicated that the participants’ attitudes 
followed the direction of the proposal, with 
higher means for the favorable condition (M = 
3.50, SE = .23, 95% CI [3.04, 3.96]) as compared 
to the unfavorable condition (M = 2.80, SE = .22, 
95% CI [2.36, 3.24]), F(1 ,63) = 4.96, p = .03, ηp
 
2 = .07. No two-way eff ect was found for either 
attitude change vs. proposal valence [F(1, 63) = 
.53, p = .47, ηp
 2 < .008] or attitude change vs. 
argument strength [F(1, 63) = .02, p = .88, ηp
 2 
< .001]. Furthermore, no main eff ect was found 
for attitude change [F(1, 63) < .001, p = .99, ηp
 
2 < .001].
A two-way independent ANOVA was used 
to test the eff ect of the two IVs on the semantic 
diff erential variable. The valence of the proposal 
had a signifi cant eff ect on attitudes toward 
the proposal [F(1, 66) = 7.21, p = .009, ηp
 2 = 
.10], indicating that the favorable condition (M 
= .66, SE = .04) generated attitudes that were 
more favorable than those produced by the 
unfavorable condition [(M = .50, SE = .04), 
95% CIs [.55, .72] and [.45, .61], respectively]. 
Argument strength exhibited a marginally 
signifi cant eff ect on attitudes toward the proposal 
[F(1, 66) = 3.39, p = .07, ηp
 2 = .05]. There 
was no signifi cant interaction between the two 
independent variables [F(1, 66) = 1.73, p = .19, 
ηp
 2 = .03]. When need for cognition was entered 
into the model, it did not exhibit a signifi cant 
correlation with participant attitude. Levene’s 
test of homogeneity of variance indicates 
that the variances in the semantic diff erential 
variable are roughly equal across the diff erent 
combinations for both factors [F(3, 62) = 0.51, 
p = .68]. Analysis of the Q-Q Plots suggests that 
the semantic diff erential variable was normally 
distributed across the diff erent combinations for 
both factors.
Discussion of Experiment 2
Hypothesis 1 was confi rmed by the fact 
that an eff ect of the valence of the proposal 
on attitudes toward the proposal was found. 
Participants tended to agree with what was 
argued in the persuasive proposal even before 
reading it. This trend was also observed in 
the participants’ attitudes after reading the 
arguments. Furthermore, the interaction eff ect 
between proposal valence and argument 
strength on attitude change supports Hypothesis 
2, that is, that stronger arguments generate 
even stronger attitudes in the direction of the 
proposal’s valence. In other words, participants 
exposed to the favorable arguments had a 
stronger positive attitude change in the strong 
argument condition, while participants exposed 
to unfavorable arguments had a stronger ne-
gative attitude change in the strong argument 
condition. These results support the notion that 
participants may have had little motivation to 
elaborate the proposal and tended to agree with 
what was proposed without thinking much about 
it. While this eff ect may have occurred because 
it is the lowest cost option, it could have been 
intensifi ed by the description of the text’s author 
as a professor and former dean of the university. 
The power of authorities has long been observed 
in the literature (for an extensive review, see 
Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004). The mention of the 
professor, an authority fi gure, may have acted 
as a peripheral cue, guiding a peripheral attitude 
change (Briñol, Petty, Durso, & Rucker, 2017). 
With little participant motivation to elaborate 
the proposal, the professor’s status could have 
had more weight on the evaluation, acting as a 
heuristic.
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Need for cognition was not found to be 
a signifi cant predictor of attitudes, and after 
controlling for it, there was no signifi cant change 
in the linear model used to explain the results. As 
in the case of the results found in Experiment 1, 
this could be a consequence of the diff erences 
from the NFC’s original dimensional structure. 
However, this result could also be explained by 
the possibility that, in a low personal-relevance 
situation, need for cognition alone is not 
suffi  cient to motivate participants to elaborate 
the proposal presented.
General Discussion
The two experiments described here sought 
to investigate the eff ects of ego depletion, issue 
involvement, need for cognition, and argument 
valence on a persuasion attempt. Overall, small 
to medium eff ect sizes of strength and valence 
of arguments on attitudes were found. While the 
literature concerning the elaboration likelihood 
model is uncertain as to the attitude-change 
eff ect sizes to be expected (Petty & Briñol, 2014; 
Teeny et al., 2017), the eff ects we found indicate 
at least a subtle change in the participants’ 
attitudes. However, no eff ects of ego depletion 
or issue involvement on attitudes were found. 
We thus recommend two main courses of action 
for future experiments: First, a more eff ective 
manipulation of personal relevance needs to be 
devised, which means fi nding a way to make 
participants feel a strong personal impact of the 
proposal’s consequences. Another possibility 
would be to modify the proposal itself so as to 
elicit greater motivation. Second, a future study 
should also test the interaction of a cognitive 
load task with the independent variables of 
Experiment 2. Nonetheless, such strategies 
might not be eff ective, given that some authors 
have called attention to certain limitations in 
relation to the ELM’s replicability, particularly 
in the case of online media (Kitchen, Kerr, 
Schultz, McColl, & Pals, 2014).
Results from this type of research could 
have many potential applications to benefi t 
consumers and provide them with psychological 
tools for self-protection (Boush et al., 2015). 
Large amounts of money are invested in the 
development of fraud prevention technologies, 
yet, at the same time, the social bases of fraud 
continue to be insuffi  ciently tackled. ELM-
based research fi ndings can be useful to better 
understand which self-protection skills are 
worthwhile for consumers to protect themselves 
against fraud. This could aid the development 
of heuristics that contribute to recognizing 
and avoiding deceptive advertising (Harrison, 
Svetieva, & Vishwanath, 2016). Finally, 
in collaboration with legal research, future 
fi ndings could be useful for detecting tactics 
that disrupt a consumer’s Type 2 processing 
and could help push for legislation that takes 
such vulnerabilities into account (Demaine & 
Cialdini, 2016).
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